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The East Timor Peace Operation: Planning and Partnership -- 3

Mark Richard Walsh, Associate Professor, Political and Military Sciences
U. S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

Presentation at the Quaker Peace Roundtable at the State College Friends School, State College, Pennsylvania, Workshop #15, April 7, 2001

(NOTE: A series of PowerPoint slides which accompanied Mark Walsh’s presentation is here.)

Continued--3

In all fairness to the international relief community, in East Timor, I think that we are learning to do better, though there were still problems. For example, we discovered that the initial emergency food distribution to Dili was consumed earlier than anticipated. On an urgent basis, a second emergency distribution operation was designed and implemented for the city during the first week in December. Pre-crisis population figures for Dili approximated 90,000 people. We planned for a distribution of rice, maize, beans and oil for 100,000. With the assistance of the international and local non-government organizations the food items were distributed successfully over a weekend.

In an after action review of the operation, it was discovered that over 14,000 tons of food had been delivered to almost 140,000 people. Missing the size of the target population by 40% was significant. When the miscalculation was examined in more detail, it was learned that shelter rather than food was at the heart of the problem. Because the shelter program had not begun to be implemented by early December, East Timorese who resided in the interior of the country had no place to live. Expecting that they would receive better care from the international relief community in the larger population centers like Dili, they inflated the number of people temporarily located in Dili. The connection between food and shelter is significant and begs the need for thorough, integrated planning. Such planning requirements have to be anticipated before the relief community engages in the response to the crisis on the ground. Once in the heat of the operations it is frequently too late to focus on such obscure details. The urgency of the moment becomes an obstacle to broad, strategic perspectives and plans.

V. Future Concerns

Peacekeeping has changed during the 1990's. Prior to the end of the cold-war period, it was the interposition of observers, with the full consent and agreement of the parties to the dispute at a relatively low cost and risk. A decade later, these operations have become full scale interventions with human rights, nation building, enforcement, and other significant components that require lengthy and expensive deployments.

The partnership in East Timor appears to be heading for success. Improved prior planning seems to be one of the lessons learned from the experience. In my judgment, the UN has learned that partnership and comprehensive planning call for offices and staff assigned from the outset to work directly with the people being helped, on such matters as governance, health matters, labor policies, schools, and many other aspects of creating a nation essentially from scratch. To their credit, sacrifice and optimism, the people of East Timor have cooperated in all of this with their international partners, and I am optimistic that when they have their first elections later this year they will be well on their way to building a successful nation. 

In answering questions after his presentation, among his responses, Mark Walsh made
the following pertinent comments:

The Peace Institute at the War College consists of only eight people. I teach the only peacekeeping elective at the War College. I am continually searching for innovative ways to improve the quality of the seminar. From time to time such improvements present themselves in unique ways. Every year when a new class begins at the War College, usually in August there is a demonstration - the annual Quaker demonstration, which goes back to at least 1966, when a group of citizens met at the bridge over the Letort Creek that runs through the War College grounds.

The gist of their message is simple: "This ought to be a Peace College not a War College." This past August the new Commandant, a two-star general, after seeing the demonstrators’ posters asked me to arrange a meeting with the Quakers.

Working with John Stoner (A longtime Mennonite activist) I was able to arrange a meeting in late September, and the Quakers came well prepared.

"We want to call attention to the huge emphasis which the United States places upon using military power to create change in the world and the need for similar emphasis on peaceful, non-violent methods to improve the human condition on the planet," they said. The demonstration in the entrance of the War College was their way of drawing attention to their cause and interests.

The response from the Commandant was that the Army and its Senior Service College shared the same hope for peace. My own feeling is that we can make some progress when we approach our disagreements with the understanding that we do have some important goals in common.

Following that meeting John Brewer, a friend of mine who is a trauma center doctor at Radford University, came to my class at the War College to discuss non-violence. He clearly gave my seminar an alternative perspective on resolving conflict and challenged their thinking on the role of the military in advancing U.S. national interests. At a subsequent seminar session, I asked the class what they thought about his talk, and to a man they felt that it was worthwhile for them to hear the information that John presented.

My hope is that some of this attention to peace and the similarity of purpose and objectives will stay in the minds of these future military leaders as they move into high positions in the Army.

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