A History of Wealth and Poverty: Why a Few Nations are Rich and Many Poor, by John P. Powelson.


Each chapter contains only the examples I have deemed necessary to illustrate the thesis of that chapter. Many more historical and current citations are necessary to convince the skeptic that the power-diffusion process is credible; these are listed here, beginning with Appendix 2.1. Obviously, no number of examples will prove any point, but an abundance is necessary to be convincing.

In these appendixes, LDC refers to less-developed countries and MDC to more-developed countries.

1.1: Institution Theory in Modern Economics
1.2: Game Theory
2.1: The Weakening Power of the Shogun during the Tokugawa Era (1603-1868)
4.1: Vertical Alliances and the Use of Leverage by Groups in Europe other than Peasants
4.2: Power Enhancement through Bargaining by Weaker Groups in Europe without Use of Leverage
5.1: Vertical Alliances, Negotiation, Cooperation, and Compromise in Economics and Trade in Europe
5.2: Vertical Alliances, Negotiation, Cooperation, and Compromise on Jurisdiction and Power in Europe
5.3: Negotiation, Cooperation, and Compromise on Religious Questions in Europe
7.1: Africa as a Trading Continent
7.2: African State Domination over Trade, Land, and other Resources
8.1: Precolonial Slavery in Africa
8.2: The Transition from Slavery to Cash Labor in Africa
9.1: Centralization of Power in Post-Colonial Africa and its Capricious Use
9.2: Recent African Wars and their Consequences
10.1: Endemic Low-Level Violence in India
11.1: China's Despotism and Centralization of Power
11.2: The Abundance of Land, Migratory Nature of Labor, and Small Amount of Communication among Social Classes in China
12.1: China's Legal System
12.2: Some Decisions Made by the Government of the People's Republic without Much Consultation with Those Affected
12.3: Inefficiencies in the Chinese Economy
12.4: Government-Mandated Decisions for a Freer Economy in China
12.5: Reversals of Liberalizing Policies in China
13.1: The Ulozhenie (1649) as an Instrument of Absolutism in Russia
13.2: Interest-Groups Arising after the Collapse of the Soviet Union
14.1: The Abundance of Land Relative to Labor in Russia
14.2: The Authoritarian Nature of the Russian State
14.3: The Quest for and Concentration of Power in Russia
15.1: Power of Iberian Monarchs and the State
15.2: The Quantity of Land Relative to Labor in Iberia
15.3: The Weakness of Vertical Alliances, Pluralism and Leverage in Iberia
15.4: Guilds and Corporations in Iberia
15.5: Peasant Organizations and Peasant Rebellions in Iberia
17.1: Centralization and Power Concentration in Modern Mexico
17.2: Lack of Accountability in Modern Mexico
17.3: Land, Lack of Accountability, and Break-the-System in Nicaragua
18.1: State Power and Lack of Accountability in Peru
18.2: State Power and Lack of Accountability in Brazil
18.3: Confrontation and Break-the-System in Argentina
18.4: State Power and Lack of Accountability in Argentina
19.1: Concentration of Power in the Middle East
19.2: State Control over Guilds and Corporations in the Middle East
22.1: Vertical Alliances, Pluralism, and Leverage in Germany During the High Period of the Estates, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries
22.2: The Accountability of Princes and Dukes Demanded by the German Estates
23.1: Power and Economic Distortions in the Third World Today
23.2: Structural Adjustment
23.3: Skilled versus Unskilled Labor in the United States
23.4: Political and Economic Reforms in South Africa during the 1980s/1990s
23.5: Groups and Emerging Pluralism in the Third World

Copyright © 1994 by the University of Michigan. First published in the USA by the University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Published on the World Wide Web by The Quaker Economist with permission from the University of Michigan Press, 2005.

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