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The Future of Europe: Spiritual Values and Citizenship

Contributions

RICHARD SEEBOHM: note on 18 January 2002

European Governance

This is the title of a think piece published by the European Commission in July [2001]. It has had a long gestation and will be open to discussion until March 2002. It arises partly from the challenge of EU enlargement but mainly from the perception that ordinary people in the existing member states have lost confidence in the European ideal. The EU does not seem to act effectively in crises (food scares, armed conflicts on its borders). It gets no credit for its successes. It is blamed for actions which have been agreed by national governments and for their inept implementation by those national governments. Many people know nothing of how the EU takes decisions and see no entry points for their concerns. The Irish voted no to the Nice treaty not from an examination of its content but because of a fear of quite other imagined interferences from Brussels.

The Commission has published a number of other studies which inform this debate, notably on sustainability (which covers everything from economic growth to environmental protection) to coherence (which covers inequalities, both social and economic, and the financial and other policies needed to diminish them).

The Commission sets great store on the ‘community method’. The Commission (alone) makes legislative and policy proposals. The Council of Ministers (representing member states) and the Parliament (representing voters) jointly turn these into ‘legislative and budgetary acts’. The Commission and the member states implement the resulting policies that are their respective responsibilities. The European Court of Justice ‘guarantees respect for the rule of law’.

The concepts underlying the Commission¹s proposals for reform are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Underlying these are the principles of proportionality (don’t use steamhammers to crack nuts) and subsidiarity ­(don’t decide in Brussels what should be a matter for each independent local authority). The Commission claims that its initial proposals often conform better to these two principles than the versions that emerge after horse-trading in the Council and Parliament.

Unexpectedly, the White Paper leaves until near the end its attempt to discern the ultimate objective of the EU. This is: sustainable development in the long term for all nation-states that consider themselves European. The building blocks of this are: ‘improving human capital, knowledge and skills; strengthening both social cohesion and competitiveness; meeting the environmental challenge; supporting territorial diversity; and contributing to regional peace and stability’.

What, then is the Commission proposing?

1. Better communication. ‘It is particularly important in some member states to find locally trusted and credible carriers of the messages the institutions want to pass on’.

2. Reach out to citizens in local regions and cities. The Committee of the Regions is new and needs to be given more weight. Some policies ­ perhaps relating to the environment could be handled as ‘tripartite contracts’, Commission/member state/region. Such developments should be coherent and not compartmentalised by sector (for example environment and agriculture should be linked).

3. More recognition of the contribution of civil society. The relationship should be structured so that privileged groups do not have an unfair advantage. The Economic and Social Committee (whose membership is to be widened by the Nice Treaty) and the Committee of the Regions should engage in policy debates at an earlier stage. The Parliament should hold more public hearings. European-level political parties could improve their visibility.

4. The legislative process could be improved in various ways, ranging from co-regulation, that is to say combining directives with non-statutory industry agreements, through to an abandonment of regulation when publicising best practice is sufficient. It should try to be less prescriptive and enable member states to do things their way. Unwelcome proposals should be more readily withdrawn, and outdated rules repealed.

5. Regulatory agencies should be used where Commission services are bogged down by uncontroversial details, but such agencies should not have to adjudicate between competing interests.

6. Enforcement of existing law should give priority to economically significant issues.

7. In the rest of the world, the EU should be more accessible to governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. It should improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of global rule-making, itself seeking to speak with a single voice.

8. The Councils of Ministers seems to have lost their capacity to give political guidance and to reconcile the interests of individual home departments. The Commission should have more say in setting their agendas. Member states should learn from each other in bringing national parliaments into the European process. The European Parliament should share the Council¹s power to specify the Commission’s competences. It (the Parliament) should thus be led to be more concerned with broad policy evolution than with budgetary nitpicking.

This is all good stuff, but what does it amount to?

Firstly, it is introspective. It reflects the Commission’s view of its own tasks and its relations with the other stakeholders in the European project. From many points of view, this is desirable, since the Commission exists to be the guardian of the treaties and of the aim which underlies them. Grievances felt by individuals anywhere in Europe are potentially a threat to each of its inhabitants. None of the recommendations in the paper are intrinsically perverse.

Two basic difficulties, however, make many of these recommendations seem either irrelevant or trivial. These difficulties are external to the Commission. One is the political process of the member states. The other is the disenchantment of citizens with this political process itself.

Politics in democracies as we know them are based on parties and party programmes. Normally there is an alternation between (to put it crudely) the interventionist left and the laissez faire right. Each to some degree seeks to unravel the excesses of its predecessor. The Commission is not party-driven. It can take a longer view because of the continuity this provides. Its work is transmitted to member states, however, through the party lens of the government in power. If, as seems to be the case, the voters are disenchanted with all the parties, or if one of the parties is antagonistic to the basic European project, the communication will be partial or non-existent.

As well as ministers of elected governments, there are three organised links between member states and Brussels. One is the European Parliament. The MEPs are in most [all?] cases drawn from party lists and not chose by voters as individuals. Where there are regional constituencies (as in the UK), these are too big for easy contact with ‘your’ MEP. This gives a ‘true’ party balance, but this is negated when turnout is low. It is perhaps a healthy counterbalance to the elective dictatorships of certain national governments that the European Parliament tends to divide more by party than by national interest. Thus the individual MEP needs to show initiative in linking in to civil society at home. This calls for study.

The Commission mentions the need to involve national parliaments more closely. The British upper and lower houses have scrutiny committees which have time to scan only some of the Brussels material, and it is not at all clear how often their findings influence events. Perhaps they ought to have a formal line to the EP so that as well as directing their views to the domestic government in its capacity as Brussels negotiator they can lean on their counterpart MEPs. One extremely encouraging development is the ‘Convention’ which drew up the EU’s new Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this, MEPs and members of national parliaments sat alongside representatives of member state governments and the institutions and were numerous enough to outvote them. The Belgian presidency of the EU has managed to persuade fellow member states to adopt this procedure for the debate on the future of the EU which is to take place between now and the 2004 intergovernmental conference.

The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) is intended to bring to Community legislation the advice of the social partners (employers and unions) and representatives of civil society. The definition of civil society will be widened when the Nice Treaty comes into force, but it is hard to know how a real representivity can be achieved. No one with an axe to grind uses the Committee as an entry point for lobbying. The Commission is right to suggest that the Committee will be strengthened if it is brought in at a more formative stage of proposals, but no notice need be taken of its views once it has laid them o the table. Its most promising way forward may be to embark on own-initiative interventions, which with its new Secretary-General may be a possibility.

The Committee of the Regions is new and untried. Its position in the scheme of things is analogous to that of ECOSOC. As far as the UK is concerned its members are appointed by the government of the day, just as ECOSOC, and they are exclusively local authority elected members. There is something of desperation on the part of the Commission in thinking they may get through by a regional route rather than through national capitals, but certainly more and more regional bodies are opening offices in Brussels. It would be a bonus if they could be a channel of communication both ways, and not just concerned with structural funds.

Finally, of course, there is the role of the individual concerned citizen. It has never been easier to access EU news and documents over the internet. I would particularly commend the introduction by the Commission of ‘scoreboards’ charting the progress of Community action in the various policy areas. The internal market version is at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/score/index.htm. It makes a good read even for the uncommitted. The networks of pressure groups and NGOs are ready to act as two-way channels. But the citizen has got to want to become involved. The media do little to help.

There is one more area of discourse which the Commission is too timid to attack head on. This is the system of pillars, under which the Commission has an enshrined place for the internal market and for a wider range of policies which have followed from economic integration, while the Council reserves its control over the second pillar, foreign policy and in particular security policy. The third pillar, home affairs and justice, is bit by bit moving from the Treaty of European Union to the Community (and hence the Commission’s freedom to make proposals on its own initiative). Member states are unlikely to surrender much more sovereignty than they have already. In fact, they are to some extent encroaching on the Commission¹s right of initiative by prescribing at Council meetings all manner of tasks which they expect the Commission to pursue to fruition. Some have suggested that the Parliament should ‘be more of a legislature’ and have its own stronger right of initiative. Its control of the purse strings is probably responsibility enough ­and I agree with the Commission that this should be exercised at a higher level of policy scrutiny. (As a point of detail, the European Development Fund which finances the Cotonou Agreement with ACP countries should not be exempt from parliamentary scrutiny.)

I need not say much about the euro. It will become a pervasive fact of life, and the distinction between its subscribers and the rest will gradually become blurred.

All that I have said so far relates to an EU of 15. It is even more difficult to awaken interest on the part of existing citizens in the implications of enlargement. The citizens of candidate countries, however, may well be agog to know how they will be affected, economically, in freedom of movement and in their relations with their own political leaders. It is my guess, drawing on experience in the Council of Europe where these countries are already members, that the new government ministers and the new parliamentarians will surprise the rest of us with their insights and their capacity to contribute.

If we don’t get governance right over the next few years, however, we shall all be the poorer.

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QCEA gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the European Commission for this project. This publication reflects the author’s views. The Commission is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained in this publication.


Further Information on The Future of Europe
Briefing Papers on the Constitutional Treaty and Referenda
Briefing Papers on the Militarisation of the EU
Spiritual Values and Citizenship Project
- Information and analysis
- Briefing Papers on Spiritual Values and Citizenship
- Calendar of events (archive)
- Contributions to the project
- Values Matter: Quakers Reflect on Europe. Final report of the Future of Europe project
- QCEA Responses to the Convention on the Future of Europe

- Reports from QCEA Associate Members’ Conference on The Future of Europe

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