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Europe and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

 

European Parliamentary Hearing on the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, Thursday, 14 September 2006, 3 - 6.30p.m.

Overview
The speakers were:
Prof. William Potter, Director of the Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies and the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Monetary Institute of International Studies, USA
Dr Bruno Tertrais, Researcher at La Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris, France
Jean Claude Brunet on behalf of Annalisa Giannella, Mr Solana’s personal representative for matters of non-proliferation
Lars-Erik Lundin, Head of Unit, Deputy Political Director, Security Policy, Relex, European Commission
Dr Bernd Kubbig, Researcher at Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt, Germany
Dr Pierre Goldschmidt, Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and Head of its Safeguards Department, Fellow at Pole Bernheim ULB and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Dr Stephen Pullinger, Director of ISIS Europe, Brussels
Janet Bloomfield, Honourary Vice President of the Campaign for Nuclear Arms, UK

This group of eight speakers came together to discuss their opinions on the future of the NPT with a view to both internal and external issues, the rising energy crisis, and also the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. The chairman Mr von Wogau, MEP stated that the purpose of the discussion was not to point the finger at specific countries but to look at whether the NPT is still the most efficient way to handle today’s nuclear landscape


What were the main points discussed by the eight speakers?

1) Is the NPT outdated and inadequate to face global nuclear threats?
It was observed that the NPT was originally drawn up as a solution facing the global community during the cold war. With an increased number of nuclear states, some of whom not signatories of the NPT, the increased threat of terrorism and the escalating energy crisis, it was discussed whether a new treaty is needed to more specifically address these issues. It was noted that it is unlikely that at this point another such treaty would ever be universally agreed upon and that the NPT has its own successes to boast of. It is not completely irrelevant and is too uniquely important to be dismissed in full. Instead various other new ideas were proposed in addition to the NPT to help tackle these three main global pressures.

o Terrorism
The NPT was never designed to tackle the issue of nuclear terror but concerns were expressed that poor arms control and/or continuing research into and production of nuclear technologies could proportionately increase the threat of terrorism. Other speakers disagreed and felt that this was adequately covered under the 2004 UN resolution 1540 and that in general the threat of nuclear terror has been subject to ‘media hype’.

o Energy
Due to concerns over the future use of fossil fuels, an increasing number of states are looking to nuclear energy to cover their energy requirements. It is the peaceful use of nuclear power that Iran is citing as its reasons for its nuclear enrichment programme. It will be increasingly difficult to keep track of nuclear developments when there is likely to be such a rapid spread of technologies. Concern was expressed that it would become easier to use the energy crisis as a veil for developing nuclear technologies for non-peaceful applications. It was suggested by one speaker that it is crucial for International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Safeguard inspectors to be given more authority and proposed that this would need to be legally binding. Janet Bloomfield suggested that alternatively it might be better to create an entirely new organisation (International Sustainable Energy Agency) rather than over-stretch the framework of the CSA. The Director of ISIS Europe suggested it might be useful to ensure that all nuclear weapons be legally justified as for deterrent purposes only rather than as coercive weapons of foreign policy. Other suggestions included a non-discriminatory method of inspection- all states to submit to regular inspections, irrespective of whether their current activity seems suspicious.

o Internal violations of the NPT
Significant concern was expressed over the ability of a state to sign up to the NPT to acquire knowledge about civilian applications for nuclear development, only to then pull out of the NPT and apply the technology to non-peaceful ends. There are currently no consequences for states who behave in this way. There was significant debate over whether Iran has behaved in this way. It was suggested by some that if Iran is found to be developing nuclear materials for non-peaceful ends then this would be in violation of Articles 1-3 of the Treaty even though Article 4 does allow countries to withdraw from the treaty. Others argued that it is important not to isolate Iran and force her out of the NPT by perceiving potential threats to be real threats.
It was suggested that the NPT no longer stands for anything or means anything if there are no consequences for failing to keep to the commitments for which the NPT stands. Has the US’s deal with India for example made a farce of the Treaty given that India now enjoys the benefits of the NPT without the costs? What incentive is there for other non-signatory states to become members?

2) What sort of strategy was discussed for dealing with violations of the NPT?
It was asked ‘What has been learned from dealing with states such as Iraq and North Korea?’ Indeed, the current situation in Iran is further highlighting that military pressure and political threats are more likely to escalate the problem rather than reduce it. It was proposed by some that the UN Security Council should become involved much sooner than is currently its practice. It was suggested that as soon as a state’s nuclear activities become ‘suspicious’, for example if nuclear materials are being enriched more than would be required for peaceful applications, the Security Council should take action immediately. It was further suggested that, in the interests of laying such suspicions to rest as quickly as possible, there should be legal basis for suspending fuel cycles automatically. The IAEA, it was recently proposed by the UN, would be a good nominee to act as a guarantor in this sort of situation. Another speaker proposed that the IAEA could also serve as a ‘name and shame’ body to highlight to the global community those states whose activities are questionable within the NPT.

Various ideas were raised for potential strategic solutions to Iran in particular. Reference was made to a report soon to be published by the Commission, entitled ‘Iran and the NPT’ and the speaker laid out a few points which he felt were achievable and worthy of mention:
1. to develop a realistic timeline to a new EU policy on Iran.
2. The EU to form a united front on Iran by the next G8 summit in order to more effectively lobby America to drop its plan for reform change in Iran.
3. to continue negotiations with Iran and keep them within the NPT as long as possible.
4. to integrate, not isolate Iran.
5. to bargain constructively to stabilise the status quo.
6. no double standards! (bargaining is not the same as rewarding non-NPT countries).
7. to develop realistic policies- no excessive ultimatums to appease a frightened European public.
8. to avoid where possible sanctions, military interventions and threats. They are not always conducive to resolving a situation peacefully.
9. to address Iran’s security concerns. It is important to note that they currently see no present incentive to join up.
10. to not view this as a situation between Islamic and democratic states but as preventing nuclear disharmony in a global context.

3) What was the proposed role of the EU in these plans?
It was observed that the divisions within Europe have been a major reason why it was not consulted when the US made its deal with India on nuclear non-proliferation and also when it denounced the ABM Treaty. It was agreed that the EU needs to take the lead in re-energising the NPT and a variety of ways to do this were discussed:
• develop a unified European strategy for Iran by G8 and persuade the US to drop its plans for regime change there as it was agreed unlikely that both could be achieved, as in the case of Gadaffi.
• encourage talks with Iran and other states of concern. Keep a dialogue open.
• remove foreign nuclear technologies from EU soil
• open a dialogue with Russia who, it was argued, will play an increasingly powerful role during this global energy crisis.
• view disarmament as a genuine option or at least look into dismantling strategic and tactical weapons which can serve no peaceful purposes. The hypocrisy of nuclear states was expressed. Is it fair to accept states such as Iran, whose neighbours are all nuclear states, to not want to also develop such technologies? It is a reasonable question to ask ‘Why can I not have these technologies if you do?’ Specific security issues however need to be taken into consideration and it was also commented upon that becoming a nuclear state is also a matter of prestige as well as security. However, another valid point was raised that even if total disarmament were a viable option, it could maybe lead to either even less transparency than there is at present (i.e. states developing nuclear weapons in secret) or to a different kind of non-nuclear arms race. It was proposed that this needed further inspection.

Conclusions
It seemed to be the general opinion among the panel of speakers that the NPT is not wholly out of date and irrelevant. Prof. William Potter in particular was keen to discuss the fruits of the NPT and the recently signed agreement for Central Asia to become a nuclear free-zone. Progress is being made and it was generally agreed that to dismiss the NPT would only stifle such progress. Various ideas were discussed as to how the NPT could be extended or given more legal authority and support because it is evident that the nuclear context for which the NPT was originally designed was very different from that facing today’s global community. It was generally agreed that the EU needs to become more united on this matter and adopt a leading role on the world stage.

 

Links to other articles on this Parliamentary hearing
http://abolition2000europe.org/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=168&blogId=1

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