A New Heaven and a New Earth
Robert Oakes Byrd
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I speak not...against any magistrates or peoples defending themselves against...evil doers within their borders (for this the present state of affairs may and doeth require, and a great blessing will attend the sword wherever it is borne uprightly to that end, and its use will be honourable; and while there is need of a sword, the Lord will not suffer the government, or those governors to want fitting instrument under them for the management thereof, to wait on him in fear to have the edge of it rightly directed)... |
The democratic nation-state was the political answer to these Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century needs. The nation-state was the answer to the need for order. Power and authority was no longer to be splintered into minute and overlapping fragments within which authority was a commodity that could be bought, sold, inherited, and that went along with the ownership of the land. Nor was authority to be shared in this life, between temporal and ecclesiastical authorities. Religion was either to be an associate of the State and an adjunct of it, or it was to be depoliticized and tolerated as essentially irrelevant. Authority - political, religious and economic - was to be centralized and institutionalized in a perpetual monarchy that was the "Defender of the Faith" and the dispenser-of-monopolies, as well as political sovereign.
As the nation-state was the answer to the need for order, democratic institutions and procedures were to provide the answer to the need for freedom from the excesses or corruption of that authority. Those who wielded that authority came to understand that they did not wield it as a private and still less as a divine right. Authority was to be wielded as a public responsibility and the voice of the people was to be treated politically as the voice of God: - vox populi, vox Dei.
This was a good system. It met, imperfectly of course, but met in large measure the need for both order and freedom and proved itself remarkably flexible and capable of adjustment and extension as time went on. But this regime, this Order, has aged now, and become entrenched, inflexible and it is questionable whether the establishment can be further stretched and modified to meet the needs of our day. Certain it is that it is providing both diminishing order and diminishing freedom.
Diminishing order has tempted us to rely ever more completely on coercive measures to create a semblance of order. The world has become ill, very ill - it has coercion on the brain.12 Increasingly we rely on coercion-backed standards - and show little respect even for these standards unless the coercion behind them is obvious, immediate and efficient. Alarming and increasing proportions of our resources are dedicated to policing ourselves domestically. Some of this increase is doubtless the result of increasing population and urbanization, with the geometrical pyramiding of problems of coordination that arises when large numbers of people live in close proximity. But this is not the entire problem, for the same tendency can be seen in rural areas of decreasing population. Disorder at the international level is but too obvious, as is the increasing proportion of our wealth and manpower devoted to coercing a semblance of order at that level.
But the extent to which coercion is our reliance for order, freedom is a luxury. It is only when and to the extent that order is firmly rooted that freedom's disorder may be absorbed and tolerated by any establishment. The greater disorder the greater the effort to limit freedom in the interest of order. We recognize this constitutionally in the United States when our Supreme Court holds that freedom of speech and freedom of the press mean one thing in times of tranquility and another in times of crisis and disorder. Freedom ceases, according to the established rule, whenever its exercise constitutes a "clear and present danger" to the security of the order, and what is no danger in tranquility may become one in times of crisis and disorder. A child is free, we are again beginning to admit, after a somewhat chaotic interregnum, only in so far as its behavior does not constitute a threat to an order of which it is only part, and not the whole. The student is free only so far as he supports the academic order, and the competitiveness and acquisitiveness that our social and economic order has prized, remain free only as long as they do not threaten the order itself. Competitiveness eventually destroys competition so competition cannot indefinitely continue free. But a domestic order that relies increasingly on legally enforced regulations to define its acceptable behavior patterns, with an increasing number of enforcement officers employed to see that these regulations are obeyed, is not a free order. It is an old regime fighting a rear-guard action.
It is to labor the obvious to spell out in detail the way in which coercion in the international order limits freedom. We pay our tithe to destruction. Ten percent of our national wealth earned each year goes into developing a capacity to destroy other peoples, other nations. But can the instruments of democracy, designed to trap a king, as one writer expressed it, effectively direct and control the concentration of technological, scientific, managerial and vested power that is constructed by this tithe of our wealth? Can a system designed to trap a Seventeenth Century monarch adequately protect freedom in an age when Kings, the electorate, their representatives, their chosen executives, are all increasingly at the mercy of experts who make use of other experts to convince us that this or that sacrifice of freedom - conscription, compulsory fall-out shelters, a conscience free of the burden of bacteriological warfare - is required in the name of order and security?
Then, too coercion tends to be cumulative. The more we rely on coercion to assure the observance of acceptable behavior patterns, the greater the coercion necessary to accomplish the purpose. The firm command to go to bed is replaced by the hand that leads and that, eventually, may spank. On its part the child may at first ignore the command, then talk back, then kick and throw a tantrum. The failure of a student to do an assignment or two may lead to a warning followed by failure of the course and, eventually, expulsion from college, with the student in the meantime reacting with increasingly antagonistic modes of behavior.
Thus coercion, once adopted, can only increase and freedom decrease - AS LONG AS COERCION FUNCTIONS ONLY WITHIN AND IN SUPPORT OF THE OLD ORDER, and fails to establish a New Order. But the temporary uses of coercion, pending the operation of a maturing process that will create a New Order, may be creative. This is something of what Isaac Pennington had in mind in the passage quoted earlier,13 for he followed the quoted passage with the observation that, though the magistrate and his sword were to be supported:14
...yet there is a better state, which the Lord hath already brought some into and which nations are expected to travel toward... And where should it begin but in some particular in a nation and so spread by degree, until it hath overspread the nation, and then from nation to nation until the whole earth is leavened. |
It is this establishment of a New Order that we hope for when coercion is applied to the young. It is this that we have hoped for in the application of coercion in achieving racial integration. Internationally this has been the hope of both "Western" and "Eastern" foreign policy. We have hoped that a coerced containment of the forces of the East would provide a seed-bed and the time within which the Old Order of things in the Soviet Union and China might change. They have hoped that coercive pressures might create a "forcing bed" in which inherent forces of decay and growth in the West could be speeded.
But the use of coercion to change an Old Order is a very delicate procedure. The results may not be at all what we wanted or expected, as every parent and teacher knows. Indeed, coercion may forestall - and often is intended to forestall - development of a New Order, or may and perhaps does produce a twisted and warped Order rather then the one we desire. Where open defiance is not possible or profitable, subterfuge, subversion or a subconscious pathology are the likely reactions to an Old Order's coercion, whether that be a parental, educational, national or an international order.
VI
But what then are the conditions for the creative application of coercion?
1) John of Patmos warns us against do-it-yourself projects of coercion. Coercion is the Lord's and not a tool that the awkwardness of men can control or use creatively. To be creative, coercion must be under God's guidance and direction, and not alone an act of man's intellect, will or emotions.
2) The object of coercion, according to Revelation, must be peace; the elimination of coercion. Revelation's New Earth had no place in it for armed or institutional coercion. Its regulations were found in the radiant and loving power of God. Its trees were not cut, stripped of foliage and made into spear shafts and chariots of war, but were left beside the river of crystal waters and their foliage used for the healing of the nations.
3) Too, creative coercion in Revelation was for the purpose of establishing a New Heaven and a New Earth, not for the shoring up of the Old.
Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, he who observed and interpreted the Fall of Rome forecast a hundred years earlier by the Man of Patmos, agreed that creative coercion must be under the guidance of God's peace. He also added some crucial and influential observations of his own.15 Augustine forsook the thorough-going pacifism of Tertullian, Origen and most of the other earlier Church Fathers. He spoke of coercion - in the form of war - as being just, that is righteous,16 but only if certain conditions were met. Essentially, he concluded that the following conditions, in addition to those found in Revelation, had to be met if coercion, in the form of war, were to be righteous.
1) The authority using coercion had to be recognized as legitimate authority. Wars could not be undertaken by private bands. Only duly-constituted authority was just authority, and no authority was duly constituted unless its relationships to God were in harmony. However, the need for order was so crucial that private parties were not to take up arms against a legitimate prince even if he were a tyrant and unjust. A secure peace, order, was more to be desired than a just desolation.
2) Love and sin were the central concepts in the thought of Augustine. Coercion exists at all only because of man's sin in the Garden and in Cain's fratricide. He divided life into body and soul, the physical and the spiritual, good and evil. Though there is a level at which all of these are unified, he institutionalizes their division into the State and the Church, the City of God and the City of Earth. One's basic loyalties, one's citizenship is determined by one's loves. If one's love is for the physical, the material, one is a citizen of the City of Earth. If one's love is for the things of the spirit, one is a citizen of the City of god, even in this life. So the love of God, and attachment to the things of the spirit, had to pervade the righteous use of violence, of war. Lust or the desire for glory or gain could have no part in a just or righteous war. Defense against aggression, and a refusal to make amends or grant rights of passage through a country were considered to be just cause for war, but only if the motivation were just as well.
3) Coercion, violence, war, are just only when all other means of inhibition or redress have failed, and only and precisely to the extent necessary to accomplish its righteous purpose. There is no room here for vengeance or vindictiveness and under no circumstances is the profanation of temples, failure to keep faith even with the enemy, looting, conflagration, massacre or reprisal-for-the-sake-of-reprisal, justified.
4) War cannot be just on both sides. Justice and the right to use violence can reside, for Augustine, and contrary to other writers on the subject, only on one side. Augustine's logical mind could not tolerate a righteousness, which is what he meant by justice,17 that was so malleable that it could be on both sides of the same conflict.
5) Coercion - or the just war - was justified to Augustine only if such coercion could actually accomplish its righteous purpose. One is not, in Augustine's thought, honor-bound to launch a suicidal Gotterdammerung of coercion regardless of that coercion's capacity to effect a just purpose utilizing just means. Coercion, in other words, is never self-justifying; it is only an instrument and justified only in so far as it is instrumental in achieving a greater degree of righteousness.
6) Finally, wars - however just - were never to be engaged in by priests, monks and nuns. Such people had a special calling to follow Jesus to the last detail and to die rather than kill even in a just cause.
Later Christians and secular thought on the legitimacy of international coercion consciously builds on Augustine's criteria. Thomas Aquinas elaborates the theme some seven hundred years later and, in the process, adds another requirement if coercion is to be just. Coercion is justified, he says, only if the undoubted evils to be anticipated from the use of coercion do not out-weigh the evils to be rectified.18 Fransesco Vittoria and Hugo Grotius, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century "Fathers" of modern international law, elaborated the theme further. Vittoria was the first to distinguish between wars of defense and wars of aggression and both he and Grotius extended and made more specific Augustine's "rights of passage" to include the freedom of the seas and the right to travel and trade in a foreign country.19
Early Friends emerged in the same world that caused Thomas Hobbes to have such a dark view of human nature, that caused Grotius so much distress, and which resulted in his efforts to develop a code which would limit both the occurrence of wars and their horrors when they did occur. This was the world of the frightfully destructive Thirty Years War and Louis XIV's adventures on the continent of Europe, the Civil War and Cromwell's dictatorship in Britain, and freebooting piracy on and off the High Seas. Under the circumstances, Friends recognized some wars as just. Robert Barclay's oft-quoted words on the Magistrate's sword, or George Fox's equally famous letter to Friends on the Island of Nevis in the West Indies,20 make the point. Barclay wrote:21
As to what relates to the present magistrates of the Christian world, albeit we deny them not altogether the name of Christians, because of the public confession they make of Christ's name, yet we may boldly affirm, they are far from the perfection of the Christian religion; because in the state in which they are...they have not come to the pure dispensation of the gospel. And, therefore, while they are in that condition, we shall not say that war, undertaken upon just occasion, is altogether harmful to them...So the present confessors of the Christian name, who are yet in the mixture, and not in the patient suffering spirit, are not in the patient suffering spirit, are not yet fitted for this form of Christianity, and therefore cannot be undefending themselves until they attain that perfection. But for such whom Christ has brought hither, it is not lawful to defend themselves by arms, but they ought over-all to trust the Lord. |
Basically Friends have here taken Augustine's position on the inconsistency of the priesthood with participation in even a just war, and, consistent with Friends' radical position with respect to the priesthood of all believers, expanded to include all those, regardless of vocation, who had arrived at a certain "perfection of the Christian religion."
Friends added another note. Augustine, and subsequent writers on the "just war," tended toward a dismal view of human nature. Men were essentially and irrevocably sinners. It is only the Grace of God and the intercession of Jesus, Mary and the Saints that can raise men a bit above the brutes. Earthly institutions, including the Church, must be accepted as hopelessly and irremediably tainted. The best we can hope for is to keep the ideal bright in a few people whose vocation this is and, in the world, to keep sinfulness within bounds. It is this, which makes Augustine attractive to modern political "realists;" and it was this that early Friends rejected. Theirs was a council of perfection. Men and their institutions, even the state, could be Christianized, and then all would be called to Jesus' example and war would be no more. Friends thought such Christianization of government possible without further delay and proceeded to lead the colonies of North Carolina, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania in this direction. Subsequently, without losing hope in the objective, Friends accepted a delay in the arrival of their New Heaven and New Earth, without denying its ultimate reality.
The efforts of Augustine, Thomas, Vittoria, and other early formulators of the "just war theory," were to discover how coercion, made necessary by man's Fall and sin, could be used righteously, justly, by sinful man. They were not primarily concerned with prescriptions for the establishment of earthly success (though there is certainly the belief that God will not allow unjust regimes long to endure) or the erection of a New Order. Indeed, writers in this tradition characteristically have been concerned to undergird what authority and order there was. But there is reason to suggest, from the perspective of our later day, that these same principles are among the conditions which must be met if coercion is to be creative, is to establish a New Order in which the occasion for coercion will be minimal and brought under control at the world level. Are these not among the conditions which must exist if coercion is not to call forth ever greater degrees of coercion and issue in still greater international chaos and destruction?
In fact, these principles are now the stock in trade of many who are professionally required to deal in coercion; criminologists, social workers, educators, administrators, as well as thoughtful parents. Practitioners in all of these fields know that their tasks require the most minimal coercion and that used in the essential interests of those whom they coerce. When coercion is used in these callings on behalf of order-for-the-sake-of-order, in vindictiveness, in vengeance, in pique or in fear, it can only initiate an upward spiral of destruction.
Internationally, can war now ever meet these conditions?22 Is it a New Earth, a New Order, that we are seeking with our tithe to the Defense Establishment - or is it a coerced shoring up of an Old Order? Is the determination to develop and to use or not to use nuclear, chemical and biological warfare seen as operating under God's guidance? Can war now be waged in order to create a more secure peace? Is war now ever waged by authorities whose legitimacy is unquestioned, or is it often precisely the legitimacy of authority that is contested? Whatever may have been true earlier, is justice now ever the possession of one antagonist? Is global war ever fought in love and solely for the support of righteousness to the exclusion of parochial gain or glory? Are not the injustices of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare inevitably and immensely greater than any gains for justice realizable by it? Is international coercion not now an instrument of our most acute disorder and as outmoded and irrational as the forms of feudal warfare which the nation-state was designed to displace in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries? Are we not forced to push Heaven further and further into the distance, creating increasingly separate compartments of life in which to keep what we believe on the one hand and what we do on the other? Are we not forced increasingly to insist that man is but a little higher than the worms rather than a little lower than the angels, to justify international violence on moral grounds, have we not reached a stage in which coercion in the service of the nation-state is even more irrational and ineffective than it is immoral? Are we not preparing "to create a desert and call it peace?"23
VII
Our problem is no longer that of establishing order and maintaining freedom within the precincts of limited patches of territory on this earth, even within John's fifteen hundred mile cube of transparent gold, lustrous jewels, ever-bearing trees, crystal waters and uncoerced peace. The problem is now that of establishing a world order, and the necessary cohesion to support that order, within a framework that recognizes all man as precious children of God.
Our first problem then is that of Order...a New Order, a New Heaven and New Earth; and can we delude ourselves into thinking that such a New Heaven, such New Order, can be a place where we might still cling to the trappings and wear the mark of the nation-state, the free-enterprise system, the communist system, racial prerogatives - black or white. Can such a New Order be designed according to the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments - or necessarily in the mold provided by Britain, France, the Soviet Union or China? Is the New Heaven one in which freedom must certainly be defined as in the United States' Declaration of Independence, or are there things man has yet to achieve beyond the right to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness," things on which life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness depend for their meaning? Can such a New Order be one in which coercion is a way of life?
We are, in a way, back where we were when the Quaker movement began: civil war, informers, charges of authority with an increasing application of violence, various parties attempting to establish their particular varieties of order over increasing numbers of people and resources and lives mobilized and destroyed in unprecedented prodigality. Friends emerged in response to the same forces and needs that brought our present political, economic and social order into being. Friends are of the warp and woof of that order. Can Friends break through the conditions of their origin and respond to and be among the instruments for bringing into being a New Heaven and New Earth for our disordered day? Perhaps, but only perhaps.
Early Friends had a vision of a New Order quite different from that which actually came into being and which has now become our Old Order. They had a vision of a universal Commonwealth in which coercion would have an increasingly modest role to play. This New Earth was to be united in the radiance of God, imminent and transcendent. They had little confidence in coercion and ordered their own affairs without the aid of specialized experts and with a minimum of institutional structure. Heaven was ever green, and close, and they were confident that the magistrate could soon be taught to govern without the authority of the sword.
In fact, the first generation of Friends may have envisioned our essential condition more clearly than we do. It may have been easier for them. Their Old Order was changing. The New had not yet taken shape, and Friends then carried no heavy traditions in their baggage. But the New Order which was then born, which is now grown Old, has had us in its grip for three hundred years. We bear its mark - but how indelibly and how inescapably? Does the mark of the Old Order, an Order in time, obliterate in us the mark of God's Order? Are we so chained in the dungeons of the Old Order that we are not able to rise to see the new and to move toward it? Do we rush back into our dungeons with their familiar terrors rather than moving out into the New Light? Do we still, somehow, hold a furtive thought that ultimate reality lies in this cave of the nation-state and that it can provide us an order that we would want or a freedom that is not a mask for slavery? Are we, in fact, but artifacts of a decaying order?
How fresh are the warnings of John of Patmos as he wrote to the Churches-in-waiting for a New Heaven and a New Earth! How clearly he speaks to us all! - You there from Ephesus, you are following the forms, faithful to the vision of the New Heaven and its causes, but your enthusiasm is dry, it crackles like the leaves of autumn - for it is without love. You in Smyrna - you are concerned with your rights and your dignity - how flighty the dignity you seek at the hands of the state. It is only the dignity of Jesus that can go with you in persecution - What else can give dignity in death? You from Pergamum - what do you really worship? Your use of your time and your resources suggests that it is not God that you worship. You from Thyatira - your inner security begins to look like smugness, not serenity. You from Sardis - your reputation is good, but take heed - you are not as good as your reputation. You from Laodicea - look to your comforts and your easy acceptance of the self-satisfied patterns of your community. Even the evil are more palatable than you in your search for insipid comforts and your too easy acceptance of the self-satisfied manners and values of your community. And Philadelphia - how soft and corrupt is your prosperity - beware of compromise in the adversity that is sure to come. Gird yourselves - stand fast - for only those who do will be worthy to worship God with Jesus.
1This study is greatly indebted to Lynn Harold Hough for his discussion of "The Message of the Book of Revelation" in The Interpreters Bible, Vol. XII, New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. Also useful have been G. Ernest Wright and Reginald Fuller, The Book of the Acts of God, New York: Doubleday and Company Anchor Books, 1960, and Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.
2"Artemis" in the Revised Standard Version of the Bible.
3Acts 19.
4See below p. 24 for discussion of basis of this evaluation. See also Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1953, Chapter 9 and Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, Durham: Duke University Press, 1961, Chapter 2.
5Revelation 6:10, King James Version.
6See Revelation 21:1, The New English Bible.
7Romain Rolland, Jean Christophe, New York: Random House Modern Library Edition, 1938, Book I, p. 383.
8For fuller discussion of this idea see: Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, Chapter VII.
9Thomas Hobbes "The Leviathan" Part I, chap. 13, English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed. E. B. Burtt, New York: Random House-Modern Library, 1939, p. 161.
10George Fox's Epistle to Friends on the Island of Nevis in the West Indies is probably the most quoted statement on this position. He wrote:
For, if any should come to burn your house, or rob you, or come to ravish your wives or daughters, or a company should come to fire a city or a town, or come to kill people, don't you watch against all such actions? And won't you watch against such evil things in the power of God in your own way? You cannot but discover such things to the magistrates, who are to punish such things. And therefore the watch is kept and set to discover such things to the magistrates, that they may be punished; and if he does it not, he bears his sword in vain. So Friends have always proferred (to) the magistrates, though they could not join them in carrying arms, swords and pistols, yet to watch in their own way against the evil doer. |
11Isaac Pennington, The Works of the Long-Mournful and Sorely Distressed Isaac Pennington, (3rd ed.; London: James Phillips, 1784), III, p. 183.
12Suggested by a phrase in The Spectacles of Faith, one of the pamphlets written and published by A. Ruth Fry during the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties. Privately published in Great Britain, 1938.
13Supra, p. 14.
14Pennington, op. cit., p. 183. See also, to similar effect, the position of William Dewsbury:
The Word of the Lord came unto me and said, 'Put up thy sword into thy scabbard, if my kingdom were of this world then would my children fight. Knowest thou not that, if I need, I could have twelve legions of angels from my Father?' Which word enlightened my heart, and discovered the mystery of iniquity, and that the kingdom of Christ was within; and the enemies was (sic) within, and was spiritual, and my weapons against them must be spiritual, the power of God. Then I could no longer fight with a carnal weapon, against a carnal man, for the letter, which man in his carnal wisdom had called the Gospel, and had deceived me; but the Lord...caused me to yield in obedience, to put up my carnal sword into the scabbard and to leave the Army. |
15For Augustine's conception of the "just war" see especially City of God, Books I, IV, V, XIX, and XXII: Contra Faustum, Book XXII, secs. 70, 75, 76 and 79; Epistles, Nos. 47, 138 and 189; Sermons, No. 56; and Retraction I, XIX 1. There are several editions of these works, one of which is in the series: The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, ed. Roy Joseph Deferrari, New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1951.
16The writer has not found Ramsey, op. cit. convincing in his effort to refute Ernest Barker's analysis of Augustine's conception of Justice. See Barker's introduction to the Temple Classics edition of the Civitatis Dei.
17See Supra n. 16.
18Roland Bainton, Christian Attitude Toward War and Peace, New York: Abingdon Press, 1961, p. 106.
19See Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 58-64 and 97-112.
20See Supra, n. 10 for Fox's letter.
21Robert Barclay, Barclay in Brief, ed. Eleanor Price Mather, Wallingford; Pendle Hill, n. d., p. 83 f.
22Paul Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 17-33, states the case for those who hold that nuclear war can be "just" in an Augustinian sense.
23One translation of "Atque ubi solitudinem, facient pacem appelent," the latin words Tacitus places in the mouth of Galgacus as he harangues the British troops into battle against the Romans under Agricola. Recounted in section xxx of "The Life of Cnaeus Julius Agricola."